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tuted in that court by defendant Viola M. Treutle against
this plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 20, 1956, defendant, Viola M. Treutle,
filed her complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake
County, praying for a decree of divorce awarding her
$500.00 per month support money, $500.00 per month

alimony, an attorney's fee of $500.00, and the care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties. This
action was assigned Civil No. 109931, in defendant Court
(R. 2).
On December 17, 1956, 87 days after the complaint
was filed, a summons was apparently signed by defend.ant'.s counsel, Dwight L. King (R. 10). The original
summons contains a date and time stamp, indicating it
was received by the Sheriff of the City of New Y ark,
December 19, 1956 (R. 10). It is not clear why the summons was sent to the Sheriff of the City of New York, in
view of the allegations of the con1plaint, that the plaintiff's "earnings" are ~~outside of the l'Tnited States,"
but in any event, on l\Iarch 5, 1957, the New York City
Sheriff filed his return indicating the su1mnons and
co1npl,aint had not been served as of February 25, 1957.
Although no other sunnnons or notice of any kind
had been given to the plaintiff herein, defendant court
on Dce(linber :2S, 1956, conducted a purported hearing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the divorce action, as revealed by the following entry
on the official minutes of that court:
"The within entitled matter now comes before
the Court for hearing, the plaintiff and her counsel, Dwight L. King being present in person; the
defendant not appearing or being represented by
counsel. vVhereupon Viola M. Treutle is sworn
and exan1ined. The Court, now being fully advised
in the premises, orders that the plaintiff's testimony is perpetuated." ( R. 5)
As admitted in the defendant's answeT on file in
this Court, no stenographic record was made of this
purported hearing. No record of any kind is found in
the court's file concerning the "perpetuated" testimony
purportedly given by the defendant Viola M. Treutle on
that day.
At the time of this so-called "hearing," Mrs. Treutle

knew she was about to leave this state, and shortly
thereafter she left Utah to accept employment in Washington, D. C. (Defendant's answer Page 2). On January
4, 1957, Dwight L. King signed a written motion informing the court of the address of this plaintiff in the
city of Caracas, Venezuela, and moving the court for
an order of publication of sum1nons in the Salt Lake
Times, a newspaper of general circulation (R. 7). Pursuant to this motion, the District Court, by Joseph G.
Jeppson, ,Judge, entered its order directing that summons hr pnhliHhed upon thiH plaintiff, in that nevvspaper,
onee e.ach \veek for a period of four successive weeks.
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It was further ordered that within ten days the County
Clerk should mail a copy of the summons and complaint
to this plaintiff in Venezuela (R. 6).
Publication was completed on February 8, 1957, as
evidenced by the affidavit of the publisher, which was
filed in the court March 5, 1957, although dated February 8, 1957 (R. 9).
On March 5, 1957, plaintiff's counsel appeared before the court to obtain the "decree of divorce." The
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the defendant court state that the divorce action "came on regularly
to be heard before" the defendant court on that day (R.
17). The same language is to be found in the Decree
(R. 21). The Findings, Conclusions and Decree were
signed and entered March 12, 1957.
At the time of the purported "regular hearing" of
the divorce action on 1Iarch 5, 1957, service of smnmons
upon this plaintiff was not yet con1plete, inasmuch as
the Clerk of the defendant court had not then made
his affidavit that he had n1ailed a copy of the complaint
and su1nn1ons to this plaintiff, as required by Rule ±(f)
(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and as ordered by
the court on J anunry ±, 1957 (R. 16). It is also noted
in the defendant court's record that the return of process
by the Sheriff of the City of N t'\Y York and the affidavit
of thP pnbli~her of the Salt Lake Tilnes were each filed
on the ~HJllt\ day as the purported hearing (See R. 9,
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and the return of the Sheriff, which IS not numbered
but which follows Record 14).
Upon this state of the record the defendant court
made its official Ininute entry reading as follows:
"This case comes now on before the Court
for hearing, the plaintiff appearing in person and
being represented by Dwight L. King as counsel;
the defendant not appearing either in person or
by coun.sel. A proof of publication of summons
being of record and on file herein, the default
of the defendant is ordered entered. Plaintiff is
sworn and examined in her own behalf. Upon
the evidence adduced, the court orders that plaintiff be granted an interlocutory decree of divorce
from the defendant as prayed." (R. 15)
These official minutes of the court are In direct
conflict with the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Decree, inas1nuch as the latter docmnents contain the
statement that the plaintiff appeared "by her attorney,"
whereas in the minutes it is said that she appeared in
person and was "sworn and examined in her own behalf."
There .are further conflicts in that the minutes indicate
that the decree of divorce was granted "as prayed,"
whereas the actual decree is not in conformity with the
prayer of the complaint (R. 21, 22).
Defendants' answer in the Supre1ne
there was no stenographic record 1nade of
of 11arch 5 and that the decree of March
upon evidence which was claimed to have

Court admits
the "hearing"
12 was based
been .adduced
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and "perpetuated" before the court December 28, 1956. It
is further admitted that there was no evidence presented
March 5, and that the decree was not based on evidence
adduced on March 5, 1957. The described contradictions
between the minutes and decree of the court are also
conceded by the defendants' answer.
Plaintiff commenced this original proceeding by
filing his complaint against Mrs. Treutle and the District
Court of Salt Lake County. Upon this complaint, .a Writ
in the nature of a Writ of Certiorari was issued by this
Court on September 16, 1957. The record of proceedings
before the District Court was filed in this Court on
September 26, 1957. By his complaint plaintiff seeks
an order of this Court vacating and annulling the purported decree of divorce.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION
IN GRANTING A DECREE OF DIVORCE 'VHEN THERE
WAS NO "LEGAL EVIDENCE TAKEN IN THE CAUSE,"
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 30-3-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION
TO ENTER THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND EXCEEDED
ITS JURISDICTION, IN THAT SUMMONS DID NOT ISSUE
WITHIN TI-IREE MONTHS FROl\I THE DATE OF THE
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ARG1JMENT
POINT I.
THE DISTRICT COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION
IN GRANTING A DECREE OF DIVORCE WHEN THERE
WAS NO "LEGAL EVIDENCE TAKEN IN THE CAUSE,"
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 30-3-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.

It is admitted by the defendants that defendant
\'"iola

~I.

Treutle made but one personal appearance

before the District Court during the time that her action
for divorce was pending in that court. This appearance
was made December 28, 1956, but there is no way for
this Court, or this plaintiff, to determine what, if any,
evidence was presented on that occasion. It is not known
\vhether she appeared in open court, or in chambers.
In .any event, it is ad1nitted, in defendants' answer,
that no stenographic notes were taken. No other written
record was made to reflect the actual words spoken or
even to record the substance of whatever it was that
1Irs. Treutle told the court on that occasion.
The only record which can be found is contained
rn the minutes of the defendant court, wherein it is
stated that I\f rs. Treutle was S\vorn .and examined and
the court ordered that h(•r testi1nony "is perpetuated''
(R. 5). vVhere, or hovv, or in or on what, it is perpetuated
is not revealed.
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This was not a case in which it was permissible to
perpetuate testimony. Rule 27 (a), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, provides in great detail for the cases and
circumstances in which testimony may be perpetuated.
The rule is clear that perpetuation is permitted in those
instances in which a suit has not been filed but is expected
to be filed, and it is believed that the testimony which
is to be perpetuated will not be available at the time it
will be required in the conduct of such anticipated suit.
The rule contains strict requirements that notice
to the expected adverse party must be given at least 20
days prior to the date that the applicant will appear
before the court and seek its order authorizing perpetuation.
Here, .suit was not anticipated since it had already
been filed. The rule covering such a situation is Rule 26,
which authorizes depositions of any party and provides
the method by which notice to interested parties should
be given.
The defendants complied with neither of these rules
and even if the testi1nony on Dece1nber 28, 1956, had
been recorded in writing it would have no more effect
than an ex parte affidaYit. It cannot even rise to the
stature of an affidavit, however, because nowhere is
its substancp or effeet recorded, exeept in the n1inds of
those \Vho 1nay have ehaneed to hear it. Ho\v it could
be uperpetnated" in SUCh n fashion lllUSt re1nain a
n1ystery.
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Webster defines the terrn "perpetuate" as meaning
''to 1nake perpetual; to give an enduring character or
existence to a thing." Merely to state the definition
reveals how con1pletely the defendants failed to perpetuate the testirnony of the defendant Viola M. Treutle.
Despite this obvious failure to comply with fundaInental statutory and constitutional law, the District
Court, without ever seeing Mrs. Treutle again, and without any further evidence being taken in the cause, nevertheless, on 11arch 12, 1957, made and entered its purported Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
of Divorce.
At the time in que.stion, Section 30-3-4, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, provided in part as follows:
". . . No decree of divorce shall be granted
upon default or otherwise, except upon legal evidence taken in the ca·use . . . and the court in
all divorce cases shall make and file its findings
and decree upon the evidence." (emphasis added.)
The phrase "legal evidence taken in the cause" means
evidence which the law recognizes as proper and adInissible, and of sufficient substance that the court may
safely base its decree thereon. 31 Corpus Juris Secundum
Evidence, p. 506, and cases there cited. It me,ans also
such evidence that is presented to the court in a proper
and legal manner in compliance with the Constitution,
the Statutes and the Rules of l)rocedure, all of which
are designed to insure that no right of any person shall

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
be taken from him except after full compliance with
the fundamental requirements of due process of law.
The phrase "legal evidence taken in the cause"
must also mean that the evidence to support a divorce
decree must be sufficient to satisfy the requirements of
law and the interest of the state, which is also an interested party in divorce actions. Nothing less than this
standard will be sufficient.
These principles have been recognized by this Court
for many years. In the case of Hyrup vs. Hyrup, 66
Utah 580, 245 ;J?ac. 335, it was said:
"Courts are not authorized to grant divorces
except for the particular causes prescribed by law,
and then only when the grounds or cause for
divorce is proved by substantial and satisfactory
evidence."
This decision has been repeatedly quoted with approval by this court as is evident in the case of Greener
vs. Greener, (Utah 1949) 212 P.2d 194.
Our systen1 of jurisprudence, \Yhich has been painstakingly developed in the last several hundred years,
has been modified and simplified as the needs of the
people and the courts have required, but despite these
changes, there still is a basic and fundamental requirernent that the records of the courts shall be so meticulously ntaintainPd that an independent and objective
exatnina.tion of such reeords ean reveal all the evidence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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and all of the facts upon which the judgment of the
court was based.
Despite this recognized principle, we are here confronted with a purported "Decree of Divorce" based
upon purported "Findings of Fact," which are in direct
conflict with the official minutes of the defendant Court,
and none of these are supported by any evidence recorded
in any place by any officer or official of the defendant
court at any time during the progress of the action.
Yet it was upon this so-called evidence, received
without notice of any kind, and nowhere recorded, that
the court based its purported Decree. Under such circumstances it seems appropriate to quote the language of
this Court in a case decided nearly 30 years ago, in
which it was said:
"The Court may have jurisdiction over the
subject matter and of the parties and still the
judgment or Decree be void because the procedure
employed by the Court was such that the Court
was not authorized to assert its power in that
way." Harnpshire vs. Woolley, Judge. (Utah,
1928), 72 Utah 106, 269 Pac. 135.
POINT II.
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION
TO ENTER THE DECREE OF DIVORCE AND EXCEEDED
ITS JURISDICTION, IN THAT SUMMONS DID NOT ISSUE
WITHIN THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF THE
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.
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The complaint of defendant Viola ~1. Treutle was
filed on September 20, 1956. Under the provisions of
Rule 4 (b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, summons
"must'' issue within three months from the date of such
filing.
A summons is deemed to have issued when signed by
the plaintiff or her attorney and placed in the hands
of a qualified person for the purpose of service. Rule
4(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
A "qualified person" is defined by Rule ±(d), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, and in the case of service in
another state, includes "the sheriff of the county where
the service is made." A Sheriff of a city located in a
state other than Utah is not a person by whom summons
may be served.
Under our rule, Summons "must" issue within three
months from the filing of the complaint, and, as was
said in Thomas vs. District Court (Utah, 1946) 171 P.
2d 667:
"It is the general rule, that, if a statute prescribes a method for serving process, the method
must be followed."
Since no suu11non.s \Y.as placed in the hands of a
qualified person \Yithin three n1onths fron1 the date of
filing the co1nplaint, it follo\vs that the defendant District
( '~ourt \Vas \vithout jurisdiction and aeted in exress of
it~ jurisdiet ion in eondueting a hearing on the n1erits
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of the case on December 28, 1956, and, thereafter, on
March 5, 1957, in granting a purported decree of divorce,
which it proceeded to enter March 12, 1957.
CONCLUSION
The record certified to this Court shows a complete
disregard of fundamental procedural requirements. Such
disregard is of particularly vital significance where, as
here, the purported decree affects the status of the
parties and that of their minor child. The state, as well
as these parties, ha.s an interest in the orderly determination of questions affecting this status.
The hearings were had and the decree entered without satisfying even the most elementary demands of
due process and at a time when the District Court had
no jurisdiction to proceed. Accordingly, the purported
decree should be vacated and annulled by order of this
Court.
Respectfully submitted,
JOHN H. SNOW and
SKEEN, WORSLEY,
SNOW & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff

1501 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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